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The PMIs suggest the economy, once again, is muddling through. The better momentum after the policy announcements that started from September has faded, but isn't reversing. However, that probably isn't enough, given the new shock from tariffs that is about to hit.
The PBC sentiment surveys suggest again an economy that is muddling through. One reason is that consumer spending hasn't fallen, with the big shifts instead being a further move away from consumption on goods to spending on services, and more saving in bank deposits rather than investments.
A follow-up to the video a couple of weeks ago. That looked at demand-side factors. This delves into the supply-side and factors behind the "deflationary mindset". In these areas, China today looks even more different from Japan in the 1990s.
My view has been that China's cycle is probably stabilising, but not recovering. Today's data are consistent with that. Production of goods and services is running a bit over 5%, but property starts continue to fall, and retail sales don't point to any inflection in consumption
The upturn in credit growth that began in June last year is continuing. That should be helping to put a floor under nominal growth. But that comes with caveats: private-sector credit lost momentum in February, and while mortgage lending isn't slowing, it doesn't show any sign of a rebound either.
A decline in CPI in February was to be expected, given Chinese New Year fell in January, and there are tentative signs of deflation pressure easing. Food prices have stabilised so far in March. And the decline in core in February wasn't enough fully to reverse the strengthening seen since Q4.
A video discussing why China isn't following Japan's path. This is the first part, looking at the seven demand-side factors that caused Japan's problems, and how China compares. The second video will discuss supply-side issues and the "deflationary mindset".
The PMIs continue to suggest that, overall, there was no lasting improvement in the cycle after the September policy push. There are though some signs that things aren't getting worse any more, with both the construction PMI and employment indicators suggesting a floor.
Gone are the days when the monetary data can make a big difference to the market mood. Today's release doesn't turn back the clock: the headline is a bit stronger, but mortgage lending wasn't, and there are distortions from Chinese New Year and definition changes.
January core CPI picked up. That doesn't look like a Chinese New Year effect, and comes after Q4 when prices were already looking firmer. This dosn't mean inflation, but if core, which has underperformed other price indicators, is now catching up, it would mean China isn't in underlying deflation.
With the BOJ's review of post-1990s Japan, we have an inventory for Japanification. Using this to assess China today, what stands out is not the similarities, but the differences. All told, on my scoring China isn't graduating to Japanification, achieving a mark of only 30%.
Data today don't help in understanding the cycle. PMI headlines softened, but that isn't unusual when Chinese New Year falls in January. The details didn't drop in the same way, but also don't look strong. Separate data for industrial profits did improve, but that isn't a reliable data series.
Official data don't suggest weak consumption. The household survey suggests it is back at the pre-covid trend, and rose relative to GDP in 2024. Retail sales don't show this strength because of rising spending on services.
Falling rates and a weakening CNY are causing concern, but I don't think they should be. If CNY weakening was pushing up onshore rates, that would be different. But $CNY rising while rates fall suggests a loosening. That doesn't ensure an economic turnaround, but it is better than a tightening.
I think the equity market – as of now SHCOMP is up 0.4% – has it about right. There are signs of a bottoming in the underlying cycle, but not the rebound suggested by the pick-up in GDP from 4.6% YoY in Q3 to 5.4% in Q4.
There are signs of a turn in the monetary data. It is tentative, but the rise in M1 relative to M2 is particularly important. If that continues, there would a real reason to feel less negative about the economic cycle.
After being -ve for most of 2024, core CPI saar rose in Q4. That seems unlikely to sustain, given the 2024 policy boost is fading. However, that core has picked up is at odds with the consensus interpretation of today's data, while being in line with the relative stability of PMI output prices.
An easing of home price deflation and the decline in narrow money growth keep alive an upside scenario where individual investors buy into the idea that policy is putting a floor under growth. But the continued fall in property sales and weakening of credit dhow any turnaround is tentative at best.
Three things stand out from the CEWC: talk of "insufficient demand"; specific policies for consumption like welfare spending; and urgency towards real estate. The overall message is encouraging, though welfare spending is unlikely to rise much given it wasn't included in the November fiscal package.
A "moderately loose" stance seems encouraging. But effecting that isn't straightforward, given nominal rates and the RRR are now so low. Rather than nominal, policy needs to work on price. That can be done by PBC BS expansion that addresses property inventories, or fiscal policy that raises demand.
After falling for most of the year, core CPI rose MoM in November. However, the impact on overall CPI was offset by a renewed softening of food prices, and PPI also remained in deflation. PPI will likely strengthen a bit more from here, but overall, deflation is still the bigger risk than inflation.
As a long-time fan, I was very pleased to have a piece in the latest China Leadership Monitor. It argues that while cyclically, spending hasn't been so bad, that isn't enough given the property bust. Even so, and despite interesting proposals from onshore economists, policy support is still lacking.
In November, the manufacturing PMI ticked up again, but the construction PMI continued to fall. But it would be optimistic to think this shows industry becoming less dependent on real estate when prices rolled over, the services PMI remains very weak, and employment continues to fall.
A chart-heavy note updating China's trade trends. Export volume growth remains strong; prices are soft but not falling sharply; EV growth is sluggish but solar stronger; direct trade continues to reorient towards EM; the growing trade surplus helps GDP growth, but not relations with the US.
A few weeks ago, we laid out a list of indicators to be watching to track whether all the policy announcements from China were generating a turn in the cycle. Looking through that list now, and it remains difficult to feel excited that they have.