A follow-up to the video a couple of weeks ago. That looked at demand-side factors. This delves into the supply-side and factors behind the "deflationary mindset". In these areas, China today looks even more different from Japan in the 1990s.
The slowdown in auto exports that began in 2024 has continued through early 2025. EV sales and shipments to DM have been flat-lining for a while already, and rising exports of hybrids hasn't been big enough to make up the difference.
The standout feature of the Tankan Reuters remains the unusual strength of services relative to manufacturing. Today's march survey shows that this gap isn't expected to close in the next few months, and is one reason for the higher rate of inflation that Japan is experiencing.
Tuesday's minutes of the February meeting show concern about weak growth. The impact of higher $KRW on inflation was played down, and the committee didn't discuss the rising services prices that have worried me. Perhaps not surprisingly given rates were cut, household debt was back on the agenda.
In advance of the CBC meeting this week, a short slide pack on the key themes in Taiwan. In particular, the rise in inflation (I took the photo at my favourite bread shop here today) and Trump's agenda keep the TWD in play for a structural realignment stronger.
My view has been that China's cycle is probably stabilising, but not recovering. Today's data are consistent with that. Production of goods and services is running a bit over 5%, but property starts continue to fall, and retail sales don't point to any inflection in consumption
The recovery in new property prices from Q4 faded in February, with prices dropping MoM. That makes some sense given mortgage lending, which has stopped slowing, but hasn't started to lift.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
While excavator sales will be affected by inventories and replacement demand, the recovery in the last few months is another sign, along with the construction PMI and credit growth, that the overall cycle has bottomed.
The upturn in credit growth that began in June last year is continuing. That should be helping to put a floor under nominal growth. But that comes with caveats: private-sector credit lost momentum in February, and while mortgage lending isn't slowing, it doesn't show any sign of a rebound either.
Today's shunto 2025 results are constructive, but not a game changer. Upside risks from other dynamics are bigger: part-time wages, the output gap, inflation expectations, processed food prices, rent, and pent-up inflation pressure in both PPI and public services prices.
There's no change in weak activity, and that even before Trump's reciprocal tariffs. The KRW has been stable, but the warning signs of a rebound in property have been accurate. The direction of policy rates is still down, but household debt issues will once again complicate the outlook for the BOK.
The slow but steady pick-up in wage inflation is continuing. The trend is now up to 2.5%, the highest in 20 years. The lift is being led by manufacturing, where wage inflation is nearer 4%. These trends will keep a floor under both CPI inflation, and interest rates.
The reversal of December's fall in jobs continued in February, but the rise is still being driven by employment in the public sector, and of more elderly workers. In line with very poor business sentiment, private sector employment is continuing to weaken.
Today's Q1 BOS survey shows the labour market still tight, giving a flavour for the early April Tankan. February PPI inflation eased, but the break with the YoY change in import prices is sustaining. That suggests PPI is being driven by the accumulated rise in import prices since 2021.
February's 4% YoY PPI sustains the break with import prices. In level terms, the break is more understandable: import prices usually rise more than PPI, then correct with global recession or JPY strength. As yet, they aren't happening, increasing pressure for PPI to rise.
Overall exports were a bit better in the first ten days of March, though still look to be below the peak of a few months ago. That semiconductor sales continue to slow isn't a positive sign for the outlook.
A short slidepack covering eight broad themes relevant for the region, from trade to demographics, services to surpluses.
The standout finding from this year's annual corporate survey from the Cabinet Office is the continued rise in nominal growth expectations. The five-year outlook is now almost at 3%. This is another clear sign of a rise in inflation expectations, with real growth expectations not changing at all.
Underlying pay continues to rise around 3% for regular workers and 4.5% for part-time. But bonuses and real wages were lower in January, and consumers continue to complain about rising prices. Household sentiment fell in today's EW survey, and that points to weaker activity in Q1.
The surge in exports this year isn't all front-loading and Chinese New Year. Through 2024, Taiwan's export data had been looking light relative to TSMC's sales. That gap has now been closed, meaning strong performance for TSMC can once again be thought of as implying macro strength for Taiwan.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
A decline in CPI in February was to be expected, given Chinese New Year fell in January, and there are tentative signs of deflation pressure easing. Food prices have stabilised so far in March. And the decline in core in February wasn't enough fully to reverse the strengthening seen since Q4.
Deputy governor Uchida's speech this week marked the third occasion since January where the bank has argued that the output gap is understated. That suggests more upwards pressure on prices, and thus rates. He also staked out a more positive view of QQE than the BOJ's formal view.
There is funniness in the data because of the holiday effect and likely tariff front-loading. But still, the surges in some of the flows are striking: server and semi sales, exports and the trade surplus with the US, capital goods imports. No sign at all of the sluggishness seen in the Korean data.