The weak JPY is having little impact on Japan's export performance. Yesterday's November data show export volumes still very sluggish, and continuing to underperform the rest of the region. Services are doing better, though even here, Japan isn't clearly outperforming.
The film Back to the Future came out in 1985, and with inflation in Japan, deflation in China, and big external surpluses once again, there are all sorts of regional economic themes that have echoes of then. Here's a podcast in which I discuss the implications, with links to the underlying research.
Services sentiment in the PMI is recovering from the October drop, but not as quickly as in other surveys. The tone on jobs and prices survived that dip, and concerns about "labour constraints and the impact of rising costs", with feed through to output prices, were prominent again in December.
There's rarely much interest in Taiwan macro. But 2025 could be different: with post-2020 domestic economic lift-off, and the return of Trump, the circumstances that have kept the TWD undervalued for 20 years might be changing. This is a detailed chart pack looking at the issues involved.
An easing of home price deflation and the decline in narrow money growth keep alive an upside scenario where individual investors buy into the idea that policy is putting a floor under growth. But the continued fall in property sales and weakening of credit dhow any turnaround is tentative at best.
The BOJ releases its quarterly Tankan survey in two parts. The summary was published Friday, and today's full release confirms the story: the forecast scores point to a labour market that is still tightening, and output price pressure that is continuing to build.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
The Q4 Tankan shows business sentiment firm, the labour market still very tight, and pricing intentions rising. A few months ago, this sort of picture would have made it easy to think of an imminent rate hike. However, the faltering of the BOJ's message since make it hard now to have conviction.
Three things stand out from the CEWC: talk of "insufficient demand"; specific policies for consumption like welfare spending; and urgency towards real estate. The overall message is encouraging, though welfare spending is unlikely to rise much given it wasn't included in the November fiscal package.
Today's data releases were constructive: the December Reuters non-mfg Tankan recovered from recent weakness with the outlook looking strong; the Q4 business sentiment survey from the MOF was solid, with the labour market tight; and PPI inflation rose again to the highest in more than a year.
Today's headline employment data were stable, but the details are weaker, and the weakness in business confidence points to employment falling in 2025. Separate export data for the first 10 days of December show momentum remaining weak.
With the strong trend growth in TSMC's sales since the end of 2023 holding, it makes sense that the pick-up in manufacturing wage growth is too. Neither TSMC nor manufacturing are the whole economy, but they are important components, and put Taiwan's cycle in a very different state to Korea.
Yesterday's BIS credit data for Q2 show why shifting to "loose" monetary policy isn't simple. The loosening of 2008-09 kicked off a rise in credit that hasn't stopped even though policy since then has been "prudent", and that in turn been a big obstacle to policy officially turning loose again.
On my estimate, China's seasonally adjusted trade surplus in November reached a new all-time high. This is partly about firm exports, more evident in volume than values. But it is also about weak imports, which however they are measured, have now been going sideways for almost two years.
A "moderately loose" stance seems encouraging. But effecting that isn't straightforward, given nominal rates and the RRR are now so low. Rather than nominal, policy needs to work on price. That can be done by PBC BS expansion that addresses property inventories, or fiscal policy that raises demand.
In YoY value terms, November data confirm that the export cycle has peaked. However, there still isn't much slowing yet because in MoM terms, exports are still gradually trending up. Moreover, at least through October, exports volumes remained strong. Semi is leading the rise.
Today's 2nd release of Q3 GDP data was revised up to 1.2% saar, on the back of stronger capex and exports, but consumption was revised lower. The rise in today's EW survey suggests growth has improved further in Q4. The cycle is solid more than spectacular, but shows no damage from the July hike.
After falling for most of the year, core CPI rose MoM in November. However, the impact on overall CPI was offset by a renewed softening of food prices, and PPI also remained in deflation. PPI will likely strengthen a bit more from here, but overall, deflation is still the bigger risk than inflation.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days. Highlights
The dip in consumption that began in August is continuing. By contrast, wage growth isn't slowing, and while for full-time workers has only just caught up with inflation, for part-time workers it is comfortably ahead. This should be setting up better consumption, and so aggregate demand, in 2025.
There's no sign of any faltering in the latest acceleration in nominal wage growth that began in 2023. That's true for both full- and part-time workers. For full-time workers, real wage growth is also improving, though so far, the extent of the change is just that earnings are no longer falling.
Inflation has eased, but outside of imported prices/goods, still isn't particularly soft. With the cycle also ok, the central bank won't be rushing to cut. So, while it would be usual to compare Taiwan's economy to Korea, in terms of current monetary policy, it has more in common with Japan.
China rates falling below Japan has attracted attention. Commentary in today's services PMIs explain the context. In China, cost inflation in November fell "to the lowest since the current sequence of inflation began in July 2020". In Japan, by contrast, "inflationary pressures remained marked.".
The PBC has followed up on earlier hints and announced household demand deposit inclusion in M1. That makes sense, and it will moderate the fall in M1. But while HH demand deposits are rising, time deposits are growing more quickly still, and it is this that needs to reverse for cycle recovery.
As a long-time fan, I was very pleased to have a piece in the latest China Leadership Monitor. It argues that while cyclically, spending hasn't been so bad, that isn't enough given the property bust. Even so, and despite interesting proposals from onshore economists, policy support is still lacking.