A video and dashboard related to China's trade surplus; for Japan, details of the BOJ outlook report and June labour market developments; July foreign trade for Korea; and the PMIs for Korea and Taiwan.
Two things. First, my latest video, discussing what's not surprising about the trade surplus (the rise in capital goods), and what is (that for exports China's global market share gains have accelerated, while for imports, they've fallen). Second, an interactive dashboard on China's auto exports.
The PMIs haven't been great lead indicators this year: they've been mainly below 50 in Q2, and yet export data have been absurdly strong. Some of that is because the export story has become so concentrated in semiconductors. Still, it is likely that the real economy will be quite a lot weaker in 2H.
Unusually, the BOJ's quarterly outlook report doesn't focus on wages and inflation. Instead, it looks at this year's two shocks – tariffs, and food prices. The bank argues that the rise in the part rate, seen again in today's June labour market data, has helped offset the impact of food prices.
The lift in exports in June was sustained in July. But I'd be sceptical that marks the start of an upcycle. The strength is all about semis, and today's PMI, like last week's BOK business sentiment survey, was sluggish. If there are upside risks for Korea, they are likely domestic, not external.
A busy day today – China PMI, Korean output, BOJ meeting and Japan consumer confidence, and more madly strong Taiwan export data.
It isn't news, but the strength of exports in today's GDP release is still eye-catching. It keeps Taiwan on the much higher post-2020 plane of growth. But with consumption weakening, GDP is now almost all about exports. If there's been lots of tariff front-loading, 2H25 will look very different.
The BOJ today was a bit less worried about tariffs, and a bit surer on inflation. That keeps a rate hike as a probability for later this year. But macro remains messy, with considerable disagreement about the contents of the US-Japan "deal", and consumer inflation expectations ticking up in July.
June data continue to suggest retail sales have bottomed. There was also a decent bounce in construction last month. Industrial and services output are creeping up. However, production overall remains in the range of the last 23M. So, while a bit less vulnerable, the cycle hasn't yet lifted.
The weakness was true even for pricing, which is the focus of the most recent policy push: input prices did improve MoM, but not to over 50, and output prices fell further. That Beijing has turned its attention to oversupply should help equities, but I am doubtful that alone produces macro recovery.
In Korea, we've had the BOK minutes (published yesterday), and June JOLTS data. In Japan, the only releases have been 10D trade data for July and June Toyota sales. China's July Politburo was also released. That doesn't look to contain surprises, but I'll be going through it later.
Today's release of local JOLTS data shows the labour market remained soft in June. Vacancy and quit rates continued to fall, hiring of temp workers eased, and filling rates are trending up The fall in the vacancy rate in particular is a sign that wage growth remains under pressure.
Yesterday's minutes showed the clear tension for monetary policy between weak growth and financial excess. The BOK seems confident that the latest macro-pru measures will work. That sets the stage for more easing, though the committee in July wasn't quite as concerned about growth as it had been.
There have been no major data releases today, so instead a few background charts: on prices and capacity in China; regional export volumes; Chinese auto exports; and regional tourism and services activity.
There have been no major data releases today, so instead a few background charts: on prices and capacity in China; regional export volumes; Chinese auto exports; and regional tourism and services activity.
The clear conclusion from the official leading indicators is that the cycle has peaked. However, given that exports always had to slow from the absolute surge in 1H25, that isn't news. The difficulty in 2H25 will be differentiating normalisation after that surge from a real cycle deterioration.
Does anti-involution produce macro turnaround when the September combination of stock market and local government bail-out failed? The markets are hopeful. I am more cautious, given China's macro problems are weak demand as well as strong supply. I'd be wrong if household savings behaviour shifts.
The government is increasingly focused on the supply-side issue of corporate involution as the driver of unwanted deflation and weak corporate earnings. However, the decline in profits has been led by heavy industry, showing the importance of the weakness of property and aggregate demand.
A summary of what happened on East Asia Econ last week, and what to look for in the next seven days.
Markets have perked up on hopes that officials will tackle over-supply. But belated publication yesterday at 8pm (!) of the PBC's quarterly opinion surveys is a reminder that business involution isn't the only challenge. Household price, income and employment expectations all continue to fall.
Based on official data, tariffs have as yet to cause any real reversal in the surge of export volumes that's now been underway for two years. That's even though export prices have, for the first time since 2003, started to rise YoY. It isn't obvious that China is absorbing the cost of the tariffs.
Services prices in Tokyo CPI for July and nationwide services PPI for June, is firm but stable. I am starting to think that the upside risks for inflation I talked about earlier in the year might have played out, though the fall-out from the Upper House election might change that again.
The underlying dynamic for the KRW has been a fall in corporate borrowing driving a structural increase in Korea's current account a surplus, which has been recycled overseas by a reallocation into foreign assets by the NPS. With that reallocation running out of steam, the KRW has room to strengthen
Data through July show upstream industrial prices have stopped falling. That should mean PPI deflation doesn't worsen further. However, underlying demand remains weak, with building material prices continuing to fall. And soft wholesale food prices suggest there's no pick-up in CPI either.
Japan's post-covid cycle has had two clear features. First, the strength of services and non-manufacturing. Second, inflation. Today's flash PMI shows both those trends persisting. Sentiment fell in manufacturing, but improved in services, while input price inflation remained "sharp".